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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHERIE LYNN TUCKER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
-vs- Lower Court Civil No. 
Case No. 930380-CA 
JAMES CALVIN TUCKER, Priority Classification 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE submits the following as his brief of 
appellee in the above-entitled matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
The above-entitled court has jurisdiction in this matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(g), (1987 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff has misstated the issues on 
appeal in this matter, as follows: 
A. Plaintiff alleges that it is an issue whether the trial 
court was unduly and unlawfully biased in changing custody from the 
mother to the father. In paragraph 3 of her statement of issues, 
appellant also alleges that the court ignored the child's stability 
and "present" custodial setting. 
In reality, the custody determination in the trial court was 
an initial custody determination. There had never been any 
permanent order of custody entered. Therefore, the court did not 
"change" custody of the minor child, since permanent custody had 
never been awarded in the first instance. 
B. The issue presented on appeal is whether or not the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding custody of the parties' 
minor child to the defendant, rather than to the plaintiff. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS. CASES, STATUTES and RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-10 (1953 as amended) is or may be 
dispositive of the appeal in this issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the final judgment and decree of divorce 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court 
Judge presiding, on May 11, 1993. 
Plaintiff (also hereinafter "the mother") commenced this 
action by filing a complaint for divorce on September 27, 1991. 
The mother was awarded temporary custody of the parties7 minor 
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child, and defendant (hereinafter also "the father") was awarded 
reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. 
The matter was heard over multiple days of trial in 1993, 
after which the trial court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and ordered that the defendant be awarded 
custody of the child subject to plaintiff's reasonable and liberal 
rights of visitation. 
It is from this order awarding the father custody of the 
parties7 child that the mother has filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The parties to this action were formerly husband and 
wife, having been married on February 26, 1988. They separated on 
or about July 1, 1991. They had one child, Jessica Tucker, born 
November 30, 1988. (Findings, 2, 5 and 10). 
2. Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in the court 
below on September 27, 1991. A hearing on temporary custody 
occurred before the District Court Commissioner, Michael S. Evans, 
on October 21, 1991. Pursuant to that hearing, a temporary order 
was issued granting plaintiff custody of Jessica, subject to 
defendant's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. (R. , 47). 
3. A trial was held in this matter on February 22 and 23, 
1993. The court heard closing arguments and made a ruling from the 
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bench on March 9, 1993. The court ordered, among other things, 
that custody of Jessica should be with her father. (R., 130-133). 
4. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
Divorce were entered May 11, 1993. (R. , 134-161). Plaintiff filed 
a timely notice of appeal. 
5. A custody evaluation completed in this matter by Dr. 
Monica Christy, who interviewed both parties to this action, and 
the child, and various collateral contacts. She performed 
psychological testing on the parties and the child, and completed 
a written custody report. A copy of that custody report is 
attached hereto as and addendum. 
6. Another expert witness testified at the trial. Dr. 
Donald Strassberg testified that he had completed an assessment of 
the plaintiff and Jessica in May of 1992. Dr. Strassberg did not 
interview Mr. Tucker, nor any of the collateral contacts 
interviewed by Dr. Christy. He made a written report and testified 
at trial. 
7. The marriage here in issue was the second marriage for 
the plaintiff. She had been married briefly at age 23, which 
marriage ended in divorce in June 1983. (Tr.R., 311, 312). This 
marriage was the first marriage for the defendant. 
8. Both parties had been employed outside the home on a 
full-time basis since the birth of the minor child. Plaintiff had 
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worked as a customer service representative for TCI Cablevision of 
Utah, for approximately five and one-half years prior to trial. 
(Tr.R., 313). The plaintiff's gross monthly income was $1,582.00 
per month as of the date of trial. (Findings, 8). Her usual work 
schedule was 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. or 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, and one Saturday every three weeks. (Tr.R., 
321) . 
9. Defendant had worked for TCI Cablevision as an installer 
technician since January of 1990, or for a period of over three 
years. (Tr.R., 476). His work hours were 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., 
for a six-day week, alternating with a four day week from 10:00 
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. (Tr.R., 464-466). Defendant's gross income at 
the time of trial was $2,021.00. (Findings, 8). 
10. After the birth of Jessica, plaintiff returned to work on 
a swing shift from noon until 10:00 p.m., four days per week. At 
that time, Mr. Tucker took care of the child in the evenings. The 
child was in the care of third parties during the afternoon, four 
days per week. (Tr.R., 321). 
11. Defendant supplied a substantial portion of the primary 
care for the child during the time of the parties' marriage. 
(Tr.R., 425). Mr. Tucker would take the child to the babysitter. 
(Tr.R., 427). When plaintiff left for work prior to the defendant, 
the defendant/father would get the child ready for the day and take 
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her to daycare, (Tr.R., 428). During the time when plaintiff 
worked a swing shift until 10:00 p.m., Mr. Tucker prepared the 
evening meal for the child, put the child to bed, and he did most 
of the other cooking on other occasions. Defendant testified that 
bathing Jessica was "a 50-50 thing." (Tr.R., 429). Several 
neighbors of the parties testified that Mr. Tucker often tended the 
child by himself, while the plaintiff visited with a neighbor down 
the street in the evenings. (Tr.R., 310-490). 
12. The plaintiff/mother suffered from severe mood swings 
during the marriage. (Findings, 22e). The court characterized 
these mood swings as "a history of emotional instability on the 
part of the plaintiff." The trial court found the defendant to be 
significantly more stable, despite the plaintiff's "substantial 
progress" made in personal therapy and treatment during the 
separation. Dr. Christy made a finding, regarding the party's 
emotional stability as follows: "There are differences however, in 
emotional stability. Mrs. Tucker is not as settled in her 
identity, has been given to mood swings, and is more conflicted and 
less stable in relationships with others. Continued fluctuations 
in mood and relationships are considered likely." (See "Addendum") 
13. Defendant expressed concerns about plaintiff's caretaking 
of the child at trial. He testified about an incident which 
occurred in January 1991, in which the plaintiff had driven off 
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with the minor child under circumstances which defendant felt 
threatened the health and safety of the child. (Tr.R., 438-440). 
He testified about an incident when plaintiff left the minor child 
alone and unattended in the bathtub at the age of eighteen months. 
(Tr.R., 436). 
14. During the period of separation, prior to the custody 
trial in this matter, defendant had visitation with the minor 
child, which was more extensive than the standard schedule of 
visitation. Specifically, Mr. Tucker picked up the child on 
Thursday night for weekend visitation, and kept the child through 
Sunday evening. (Tr.R., 330-332, 369). Mr. Tucker also had 
additional extra visitation with the child at his request. (Tr.R., 
340) . 
15. After leaving the marital home, the plaintiff lived alone 
with her daughter in a rented home for about one year, and then 
moved in with her parents for approximately eight months. She then 
purchased a home in conjunction with one Shawnda Stevens 
approximately one month before the trial. (Tr.R., 365). 
16. Mr. Tucker remained in the marital residence, the same 
residence where the child had lived during the parties7 marriage, 
from the time of the parties7 separation through the time of the 
trial. (Findings, 10). Accordingly, plaintiff had three 
residences during the eighteen month period of the parties7 
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separation, while the defendant continued to reside in the marital 
home with which the child was familiar. 
17. After separating from the defendant, the mother became 
involved in a relationship with another woman, Ms. Stevens, which 
plaintiff testified was a monogamous and committed lesbian 
relationship. Ms. Stevens cohabitated with plaintiff in 
plaintiff's parents7 home commencing in September of 1992. (Tr.R., 
345-346). Plaintiff and Ms. Stevens then purchased a home together 
approximately one month prior to the trial. (Tr.R., 346). It 
should be noted that no custody evaluator ever assessed the fitness 
of Ms. Stevens to act in the role of a parent or stepparent to the 
minor child. 
18. After receiving the reports of both expert witnesses, and 
after two days of trial testimony, Judge Noel made findings which 
were incorporated eventually into the court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, attached hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A trial court is to exercise its discretion in awarding 
custody, in the best interests of the child. The findings of the 
trial court support the award of custody to James Tucker. The 
findings were adequate. The trial court applied proper legal 
standards established in the state of Utah for custody 
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determinations in awarding custody to the father. The plaintiff 
inaccurately assumes that the trial court based its decision solely 
upon the plaintiff's sexual preference. In reality, the trial 
court expressly stated that it did not deprive the plaintiff of 
custody on the basis of her sexual preference. The court listed at 
least a dozen factors, all of which went into the determination 
regarding custody. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT CUSTODY OF THE CHILD. 
A. The court did not "change" custody. 
Throughout her brief, the plaintiff asserts that the trial 
court abused its discretion in ordering a "change" of custody from 
plaintiff to defendant. This tends to raise the issue before this 
court as an issue of a modification of custody rather than a 
determination of custody in the first instance. It is clear that 
there was a temporary custody order in this case, but there was no 
permanent custody order ever entered until May 11, 1993. A 
temporary order is, by definition, not a permanent determination of 
custody. The first and only evidentiary hearing held in this 
matter to determine custody was the trial which forms the basis for 
this appeal. 
9 
B. Standard of review. 
A trial court judge has very broad discretion in making 
custody determinations. It is the trial court judge who is in a 
position to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of 
witnesses. If the trial judge weighed carefully all the evidence 
presented and ruled within established legal guidelines, then this 
appellate court may not reverse the custody award of the trial 
court. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d, 647 (Ut., 1988). 
C. Legal standard for custody determination. 
The statute which sets forth the legal standard for a 
determination of custody is found at Utah Code Ann., §30-3-10 (1989 
as amended). This statutes requires the trial court to consider 
"the best interests of the child." 
This statutory provision has been interpreted in case law in 
which the courts have set forth a number of factors to consider in 
determining custody, including the following: the need for 
stability in the custodial relationship and environment; 
maintaining an existing primary custodial bond; the relative 
strength of the parental bonds; the relative abilities of the 
parents to provide care, supervision and a suitable environment for 
the child and to meet the needs of the child; the preference of a 
child old enough to evaluate the custody question; the benefits of 
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keeping siblings together and enabling sibling bonds to form; the 
character and emotional stability of each proposed custodian; each 
parent's desire for custody; and the apparent commitment of the 
proposed custodian to parenting. Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d., 52 (Ut. 
App., 1990). 
D. The trial court properly considered all 
relevant factors in its custody award. 
Plaintiff, makes an argument that the trial court ignored the 
child's supposed stability in the home of the plaintiff. First, 
this argument ignores the fact that the placement in the home of 
the mother was a temporary placement. Therefore, the 
considerations set forth in Hogge v. Hogge, cited by the plaintiff, 
simply do not apply because this is not a modification case. 
More importantly, plaintiff's argument ignores all of the 
evidence in favor of the court's determination that the child was 
also significantly in the care of the defendant and would be stable 
in the home of the defendant. Plaintiff's argument ignores the 
evidence that the parties, had a joint parenting arrangement when 
they were together, and that the parties had something akin to a 
true joint custody arrangement after their separation, by the 
acquiescence of the plaintiff. Plaintiff's argument ignores the 
fact that it was defendant who often got the child ready in the 
morning and that it was defendant who often cared for her in the 
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evening, prepared her primary meal of the day, and put her to bed. 
Plaintiff's argument ignores the testimony adduced at trial from 
the parties' neighbors and friends that the plaintiff was often 
absent from the home, visiting friends and leaving the child in the 
care of defendant. This argument ignores the report of Dr. Monica 
Christy, finding that the defendant was actually the more nurturing 
and caring of the two parents. 
Defendant acknowledges that the case law in the state of Utah 
requires that, in a custody dispute between fit parents, 
"considerable weight" should be given to the identity of the 
primary caretaker in a case where the child has been in the care of 
one parent. The trial court in this matter has done exactly that. 
The trial court addressed the question of the primary care provided 
by plaintiff at numerous points in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and still reached the conclusion that defendant 
should have custody of the child. Specifically, in Findings number 
22b and 22c, the court addressed the issue of plaintiff's temporary 
custody and found that a change in custody would not be traumatic 
to the child because of her age, general condition of health and 
well-being, and the level of bonding to her father. Further, the 
court found specifically that any trauma caused in the short-term 
by a change in the temporary custody arrangement would be set off 
by a long-term advantage to the child of living with her father. 
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The trial court did exactly what it has been mandated to do. It 
considered long and hard the fact that the child has been in 
plaintiff's custody, and the impact of the change in custody. 
Plaintiff's assets at page 29 of her brief that the court below 
failed to make a specific finding that Jessica was in her mother's 
custody for eighteen months. This is patently false. See Finding 
22b. 
E. Other factors considered by the trial 
court support the trial court's award of 
custody. 
The plaintiff asks this court to focus almost exclusively on 
the issue of which parent had temporary custody of the child during 
the pendency of this action. The court did address this issue and 
did give substantial consideration to the primary residence of the 
minor child during the pendency of the divorce case. However, the 
court considered a number of other factors which weighed heavily, 
and should have weighed heavily, in the custody determination. For 
plaintiff to assert that "Judge Noel has provided no compelling 
reasons to change custody in this case. . ."is simply false. 
The court made the following specific findings in further 
support of its custody order. The court found that there had been 
a custody evaluation conducted by Dr. Monica Christy, that Dr. 
Christy was the only expert who had examined all parties to this 
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action, and that her recommendation was in favor of awarding Mr. 
Tucker custody. (Findings, 22a). The court found that the minor 
child had a stronger bond with her father. (Findings, 22d). The 
court found that there was a history of emotional instability on 
the part of the plaintiff, that plaintiff had made substantial 
progress in dealing with this issue in personal therapy, but the 
court concluded that the father was significantly more stable 
emotionally. (Findings, 22e). The court considered the issues of 
the minor child's preference and siblings in the minor child's 
home, and found that, due to the minor child's circumstances, both 
issues were moot. (Findings, 22f and 22g). The court found that 
the defendant was able to spend slightly more time providing 
personal care for the minor child than the plaintiff. (Finding, 
22h). The court found that the child's church functions and 
activities were important personally to the child and that there 
was more religious compatibility between the defendant and the 
minor child and that the defendant was more likely to foster a 
continued involvement of the minor child in her church activities 
in which she had previously participated. (Findings, 22i). The 
court found the defendant to be more morally fit to care for the 
minor child. (Findings, 22j). 
Apparently, it is plaintiff's argument that a court should, by 
rote, award custody of children to the parent who has temporary 
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custody, unless the child has been seriously abused or is showing 
significant deterioration in the home of the temporary custodian. 
Plaintiff seems to argue that the court should do this, even when 
the temporary custodian is emotionally unstable and the child is 
more bonded to the non-custodial parent. The effect of this would 
be to impose a standard of a substantial change in circumstances 
upon all parents seeking custody. Further, such a standard would 
undermine the Commissioner system in the District Courts, and would 
force judges and parties to allow full multiple day trials on 
custody issues, to determine temporary custody, even before the 
performance of a custody evaluation or before discovery in a case, 
in order to avoid violating a party,s rights to due process. 
Where, as here, the trial court has done exactly what the 
appellate courts have directed, in considering the impact of a 
change in custody from the temporary custodian to the other parent, 
that trial court determination should not be disturbed. 
F. The trial court did not show bias against 
homosexual parents in its ruling. 
Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the trial court deprived 
plaintiff of custody of her child based solely upon her admission 
that she was bisexual or homosexual and was residing with a woman 
in a lesbian relationship. 
Defendant concedes that a parent's sexuality, in and of 
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itself, is not a sufficient basis upon which to deny completely a 
parent's fundamental right. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d., 641 (Ut., 
1980). Defendant admits that plaintiff's homosexuality is neither 
a mental illness nor a deviancy, and in and of itself is not a 
basis to deprive a parent of rights in a child. Defendant does not 
seek to deprive plaintiff of her parental rights. In fact, he 
expressly seeks to foster a good relationship between plaintiff and 
the parties' daughter, and encourages the plaintiff to have 
substantial visitation with the child. The lower court, too, 
adopted this same posture. The court made a specific finding that 
plaintiff's sexual preference is neither a mental illness nor a 
deviancy. (Findings, 22j.ii). The trial court did not terminate 
the plaintiff's parental rights in any regard, and in fact, the 
trial court awarded her joint legal custody, and liberal rights of 
visitation. (Findings, 23 and 25). 
The trial court appropriately analyzed the plaintiff's 
relationship with her lover in exactly the same manner it would 
have been analyzed had plaintiff been involved in a heterosexual 
relationship. Defendant submits that, had plaintiff left the 
marital residence to separate from her child's father, then lived 
alone for a few months, then moved into her parents' home with a 
male lover, then purchased a home with a male lover, and had she 
then permitted the minor child to see her cohabitating both in her 
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parents' home and in her own home with her male lover, even to the 
extent of allowing the child to get in bed between herself and her 
male lover, the court would appropriately have questions about 
plaintiff's judgment and moral fitness to act as a parent to her 
child. The court would properly question the stability of someone 
entering three marriage-like relationships by the age of thirty-
two. The court would properly querstion the judgment of someone 
entering a third "marriage" before she is divorced in the second. 
The court would properly question the stability of someone moving 
into three separate residences in eighteen months. 
Plaintiff's conduct should not be viewed more favorably simply 
because her lover is female rather than male. Judge Noel evaluated 
plaintiff as she would have been evaluated had she been 
heterosexual. 
Plaintiff herself admitted at trial that Jessica would crawl 
into bed at night with plaintiff and Ms. Stevens. (Tr.R., 353-
354) . 
A trial court in a custody case is expressly ordered to 
consider a prospective custodian's "character and emotional 
stability." The court is mandated to consider whether the parent 
can provide "a suitable environment for the child." Moon, supra. 
It would, therefore, have been an error for the trial court to fail 
to consider plaintiff's relationship with Ms. Stevens. 
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G. The trial court did not make erroneous 
findings of fact. 
Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the trial court's award of 
custody to the father cannot be sustained because the findings are 
clearly erroneous. This is simply not the case. 
The plaintiff's first quarrel is with the court's finding 
about the level of bonding between the child and father. In the 
court's finding of fact, the trial court specifically states that 
the basis of its finding is the testimony of the child's 
babysitter. The plaintiff cites to this Court testimony of the 
custody evaluator, Dr. Monica Christy, to the effect that the 
parents were "equally bonded" to the child, and the finding of Dr. 
Strassberg, to attempt to overcome the court's determination about 
bonding. Plaintiff simply does not address the testimony of the 
minor child's babysitter, upon which the court ultimately relied, 
to establish that the court's finding is clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiff's own mother testified that Jessica is strongly 
bonded to her father and that Mr. Tucker is a good father. (Tr.R., 
228) . 
In virtually every trial, witnesses testify to contradict each 
other. The trial court in this case heard the testimony of both 
experts cited by plaintiff, and also heard the testimony of the 
babysitter and others, and found that the court should rely on the 
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testimony of the babysitter about the level of bonding between the 
child and father. Plaintiff cannot overcome the trial court's 
finding, nor establish that it was clearly erroneous, simply by 
citing that there was other testimony in the record which the court 
might have believed instead. 
Plaintiff takes exception to the trial court's finding that 
the defendant could spend "a bit more time with the child11 than 
could the plaintiff. In making this finding, the trial court heard 
testimony about the parties' respective work hours, the distance 
they had to travel to work, other activities in which they had been 
involved outside the home. The court below heard testimony about 
the plaintiff's propensity to leave the minor child at home, to go 
visiting neighbors and friends. If one analyzes plaintiff's work 
schedule and defendant's work schedule, it is clear that plaintiff 
works a forty-hour work week every week for two weeks, and a forty-
eight hour work week every third week. It is clear that Mr. Tucker 
works a forty-eight hour work week one week, alternating with a 
thirty-two hour work week the next. Plaintiff therefore works 168 
hours in four weeks compared to defendant's 160 hours in four 
weeks. When the work schedules are compared it is clear that the 
plaintiff may have "a bit" more personal time to spend with the 
child. He has a greater tendency, based upon his past conduct, to 
actually spend available time with the child. Again, the court's 
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finding is not clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiff's next argument regards the court's finding about 
religious compatibility between the defendant and the child. It is 
true that both parties describe themselves as being members of the 
LDS Church. However, testimony was adduced at trial by plaintiff's 
own mother that her daughter was not particularly regular in her 
church attendance. In response to the question: "Is it accurate to 
say that Lynn does not regularly attend church at this time?" 
plaintiff's mother responded "yes." Plaintiff's mother also 
testified that Jessica's involvement in LDS Primary is something 
that is important to Jessica personally, and that Jessica enjoys 
attending this activity. (Tr.R., 230). On the other hand, the 
testimony from Mr. Tucker was to the effect that he attended church 
regularly with his daughter. Both parents agree that the child 
should attend the LDS church and participate in activities. 
Therefore, the court's finding that there was greater religious 
compatibility between the defendant and the minor child was 
appropriate, given the defendant's greater tendency to participate 
in church activities with the child, which the child apparently 
enjoyed. 
Plaintiff takes exception ifith the court's finding that there 
was a history of emotional instability on the part of the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff herself admits in her brief that the issue of 
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whether or not the plaintiff was emotionally unstable prior to her 
marriage to defendant and during her marriage to defendant was 
"hotly disputed." By definition, if an issue is "hotly disputed," 
then there is evidence produced by both sides to support different 
viewpoints. Plaintiff produced substantial evidence at trial 
attempting to deny that she had been "emotionally unstable." 
Defendant produced substantial evidence at trial attempting to 
demonstrate that plaintiff had in fact been "emotionally unstable." 
Plaintiff's own mother testified that, in 1991, plaintiff was 
"really depressed and very unsure of herself." Plaintiff's mother 
testified that she told defendant that Ms. Tucker would eventually 
just give Jessica to him. (Tr.R., 230) Again, where evidence is 
in contradiction, it is the trial court's duty to hear the evidence 
and to resolve the factual dispute. Here, the trial court 
fulfilled its duty by hearing the conflicting evidence and making 
a determination. Again, by definition, the trial court's decision 
cannot, therefore, be "clearly erroneous." 
Plaintiff objects to the court's finding about her "moral 
fitness." This issue has already been addressed above. 
In summary, the trial court addressed in its findings the 
issue of who had been the primary caretaker for the child. The 
court addressed the general interest in continuing previously 
determined custody arrangements. The court considered the duration 
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and depth of each party's desire for custody. (It should be noted 
that the parties engaged in protracted litigation seeking custody, 
lasting over one year duration. Had either party not had a 
compelling desire for custody, it is clear that the party lacking 
a compelling desire for custody would have dropped out of the 
contest long before he or she incurred the financial cost and 
emotional expense of the trial. Plaintiff also attempts to 
establish that defendant lacked a desire for custody because he did 
not seek custody in the first instance. Dr. Monica Christy 
explains this apparent contradiction by pointing out that Mr. 
Tucker believed, in the beginning, that a father could not obtain 
custody of a pre-school aged child.) 
The court addressed the ability of either parent to function 
as a parent. The court considered the child's need for stability. 
The court considered the emotional health and well-being of each 
parent. The court considered that the defendant continued to 
reside in the home with which the child was familiar, while the 
plaintiff had moved three times during an eighteen month 
separation. The court considered the child's bonding to each 
parent, and the parties' religious compatibility with the child, 
and the judgment and moral fitness of each. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having appropriately considered all of the evidence in the 
case and having made proper findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the trial court properly awarded the parties joint legal 
custody. The trial court properly made the defendant the primary 
physical custodian and awarded the plaintiff liberal rights of 
visitation. None of the court's factual findings are clearly 
erroneous, since the evidence at trial was substantially in 
contradiction on almost all issues. The trial court should only be 
reversed if there is an abuse of discretion. There is not an abuse 
of discretion in this case, and the trial court's determination 
regarding custody should stand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of December, 1993. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused 
the foregoing APPEAL BRIEF to be served upon plaintiff by mailing 
two true and correct copy of the same in an envelope, postage pre-
paid, and addressed to: 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
on the day of , 1993. 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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INTERMOUNTAIN COUNSELING 
CENTER 
545 East 4500 South, Suite E-260 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 263-3335 
MONICA D. CHRISTY. PH{J 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 
DIRECTOR 
LYNETTE MALMSTROM, LCSV» 
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKEJJ 
ELAINE A. WINTER. LCSV* 
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKPH 
SANDRA FOSTER. MSty 
CERTIFIED SOCIAL WORKER 
BRUCE IACOBSON. PH.D 
COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 
AND ASSOCIATES 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
TUCKER, James 
AGE: 33 
DATE OF BIRTH: 3-26-58 
REFERRED BY: Fphraim H. Fankhauser and Mary C. Corporon 
JUDGE: The Honorable Michael Evans 
CIVIL NO.: 91-4903959DA 
DATE OF EVALUATION: 1-10-92 to 3-2-92 
DATE OF REPORT: 3-13-92 
ASSESSMENT TOOLS: 
Individual Clinical Interviews—3, total of 3 hours 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 
Rotters Incomplete Sentence Blank 
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire 
Report of Educational, Occupational, and Residential History 
Parent Questionnaire 
Child Care History 
Home Visit 
Individual Interview with Carol Birchf Lynne Tucker's mother 
Telephone Interview with Donna B. Steadmanf Jessica's former day 
care teacher 
Review of letters submitted on behalf of Lynne and James Tucker 
REASON FOR REFERRAL: 
Lynne and James Tucker were both referred for psychological 
evaluations in conjunction with a custody dispute involving their 
three-year-old daughter, Jessica Lynn. Custody recommendations 
were also requested. 
FAMILY AND MARITAL HISTORY: 
Jim grew up in the L.A. area. His mother divorced his father 
when he was one or two years of age and his natural father later 
died when Jim was sixteen without Jim ever having known him. His 
again when Jim was two or three years of age. mother married 
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They divorced when Jim was eight. He describes his stepfather as 
having cared for them but not wanting the responsibility of a 
family, preferring to be a playboy. Jim was a spokesman for his 
four brothers and sisters in terms of arranging visits with his 
stepfather. Jim recalls that the family had alot of financial 
problems and there were problems with child support and sporadic 
visitation. His mother worked as an RN after the divorce. They 
had a good relationship and he feels he is like his mother in 
that both of them are easygoing. 
Jim obtained a "B-M average during high school. Jim attended a 
school in which there were racial problems and prevalent use of 
drugs. There was also some violence in the neighborhood so the 
family moved to Orange County before he finished high school. 
Jim never used drugs or smoked himself and dated little in high 
school. He played church sports and excelled in this area. He 
lived with his mother until he was 20 years old at which point he 
went on a mission to South Africa. Before the mission, he dated 
frequently. Upon returning, he attended Community College and 
lived in an apartment with his brother. He then moved in with 
his stepfather for awhile, became involved in church activities, 
and tried a variety of jobs. Jim had two serious relationships 
before he met and married Lynne. The last one was for about two 
to three years bnt he decided against proposing since her mother 
was vindictive and nTS alTTffTend WSLS not-' t-ti^f prefty. "He became 
involved in many church activities and groups. He and Lynne 
dated for about six months and he recalls that they had fun 
together and had many similar outdoor interests. 
Jim and Lynne were married in the LDS Temple in February of 1988. 
He recalls that as soon as she became pregnant she went into a 
five month depression and acted as though she hated him. He did 
not understand the reason for her depression or anger. He was 
working on commission and after he quit that job, at her 
insistence, she seemed to be less dpprpsspd. she, was upset that 
he watched JU. ;_r> h4-e- ^azaBuzs and that he wore pajamas around" tie 
holism. Jim recalls that she complained that he was not a m=m 
unless he went hunting and compared him to he*- fnrmer frtrbbalf8 and 
Jier.father. Since- L-ynu^ - -e^reTTenced pain with intercourse, there 
were sexual problems as well. Jim understood that Lynne had been 
involved in a lesbian relationship for awhile before she was 
married but he believed that she had religiously resolved this 
aspect of her past and was committed to a heterosexual 
relationship. 
Jim felt that Lynne never trusted him and he did not understand 
why. She would not even reveal her salary to him. She began to 
spend an increasing amount of time at a lesbian couple's home 
down the street. Jim maintains that he took care of the house 
inside and out and did all of the dishes and cooking. He feels 
that she did not spend enough time with Jessica and once left her 
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in the bathtub for a couple of hours while she was visiting her 
friend, Vickie. She was not interested in attending church and 
she felt that others in the neighborhood did not like her. 
Jim maintains that when the couple separated in June, he let 
Lynne take Jessica for fear that she would kidnap Jessica if he 
objected. He felt that Lynne would eventually decide to allow 
Jessica to live with him. Lynne recalls that Jim was fine with 
the custody arrangement until he received a phone call from a 
neighbor. Jim admits to having received this phone call in which 
he was told that he needed to be very concerned about Lynne1 s 
lifestyle and the effect upon Jessica. Jim initially expressed 
many concerns about the effect upon Jessica if she were to live 
in a household where there was homosexuality. Although he had 
refused to speak with two lesbian women with families, as Lynne 
had requested, he was more open to information presented by this 
examiner. Specifically, when told that living with a lesbian 
m o t h e r has not been shown to affect children's sexual 
orientation, he was able to accept this information. Apparently 
he had been told by friends that children are "destroyed" in 
these families. He noted that he was as concerned about Lynne's 
emotional stability as he had been about her homosexuality. 
Although Jim is attempting to keep an open mind on this issue, it 
is not known to what degree his disapproval of Lynne's lifestyle 
would affect his encouragement of a mother-daughter relationship 
and visitation if he were to receive custody. 
EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY: 
After graduating from high school in 1976 and returning from a 
mission, Jim attended Golden State Junior College in California 
part time for about a year. He has also attended approximately 
three years of college, majoring in business, at the University 
of Utah without obtaining a degree. Prior to 1990, Jim had held 
a number of different kinds of jobs for one to two year periods 
of timeJ He has worked in retail sales and attempted careers 
selling real estate and insurance. He also worked as a waiter 
at the University of Utah and another restaurant. Since January 
of 1990, he has been employed at TCI Cable as a technician. 
Jim plans to finish his business degree and is waiting for the 
custody decision before planning when he will reenroll. He has 
discovered that he really enjoys landscaping and plans to go back 
to school when he is in his 4Q's to major in landscape 
architecture. He would like to then pursue a career in this 
field in his 50fs and 60 fs. Although he would like to continue 
'living in the same house for a long time to come, he acknowledged 
that he may need to move closer to a university to both work and 
attend school. If he obtains custody, these educational plans 
will be delayed somewhat. 
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MEDICAL AND COUNSELING HISTORY; 
Jim's medical history is minimal, including a tonsillectomy, a 
burn on his wrist, and a few stitches when he was a child. 
Jim recalls that when he was about twelve years of age, his 
mother knew a counselor in California and had each one of the 
children interviewed to see if they had been affected by the 
divorce. Jim was assessed as being somewhat behind socially but 
otherwise having no problems. In his early 20's Jim had some 
hurt feelings about his mother's divorce and not having a father. 
He resolved these on his own. In his mid 20's, Jim saw a 
counselor at the University Counseling Center for six or seven 
times to learn more about himself but was not having any specific 
emotional problems. Jim recalls being confused and worried 
during the first part of his marriage. He feels that the last 
six months have been emotionally traumatic but he has not been 
depressed. He recommended that he and Lynne attend counseling 
through LDS Social Services during the marriage but she felt that 
the counselor would be biased. He later attended only one 
session with her counselor. Jim has never been hospitalized due 
to emotional problems and has not been suicidal. 
SCREENING FOR ALCOHOL/DRUG ABUSE, VIOLENCE, AND ARRESTS: 
Jim tasted his stepfather's beer when he was a child but has not 
used alcohol since and has never used drugs. Jim steered away 
from the use of these substances since both of his grandmothers 
were alcoholics and because of his religious beliefs. 
Jim noted that he has "tapped Jessica's behind" and threatened to 
spank her but he would never do so. He has not used violence 
against anyone. He has never been arrested except for a false 
arrest oh one occasion when he was picked up because he had the 
same birth date and name as someone who had a warrant out for 
his arrest. The matter was quickly dropped when the police 
discovered the mistake. 
PERSONALITY APPRAISAL: 
J i-nr iiiipicLscd tJM-s^  -examiner as a very caring, honest, trusting 
(almost naievely so)/ ^ motional individual. He had some trouble 
'aescrr ibLn-g—h i 5 ojetr. personality *nri does pnt have a highly, 
inquiring nature._ He is easygoing to The "point that he may at 
cimes let~~tasks slide; this may be irritating to others. 
Nevertheless, letters from his former employers and neighbors 
reveal that he is the person they would turn to to take care of 
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important matters. Even Lynne's mother is very appreciative of 
his character. 
Jim feels that he has alot of patience with others and himself 
but indicated that this is also a weakness in that he sometimes 
thinks that time will solve problems and thus wastes time. He 
views himself as a very kind person who is sensitive to others' 
feelings. He has good self-esteem, believing that his IQ is 
above average and that he can do almost anything if he takes the 
time. He has had trouble motivating himself to finish school 
which is of concern to him. He usually handles stress well but 
indicated that he does bite his nails. Jim said that he tries 
hard to not become angry and that he has never felt angry at 
Lynne although he has felt hurt alot. He recognizes that she has 
never intentionally tried to hurt him. 
Jim responded to the MMPI questions in a way that is socially 
acceptable and tends to minimize weaknesses. However, an 
analysis of his responses revealed no conscious defensiveness, 
i.e., there was no deliberate attempt to slant his responses in a 
self-favorable direction. His cliniral-prnfJULe is ^ similar to 
individuals who tend to play rather J:ixed social role^and want 
to be seen by others as rpasonablr and: ":onf orminq ho commoji 
social standards. He is above average as cbmpdied to others in 
terms of his level of organization and practical functioning. He 
may tend to act as though others should conform to his 
stereotypes and social expeati^ '-aiiss more than they actually do. 
At times he may have 3 lack of self-awarenesS-* and consequences 
for his actions. Gener~all y__h£ ""tends ^o^overcontrol angry 
impulses which can lead tcy angry outburst's^j^rom time to time. 
(In Jim's case, since there were no allegations of any display of 
anger, this interpretation may not apply to him.) He does tend 
to externalize problems away from himself, i.e., blame oJLhers 
when ^Mrujs ^o not work out well. There were no significant 
symptoms oiP anxiety o T d~epTe"5~s ib n. He tends to be more 
interested in verbal and aesthetic interests rather than 
mechanical and outdoor activities. 
Rebellious feelings towards one's father is also associated with 
this profile. Such individuals, however, tend to show their 
resentments and anger indirectly. His profile, although 
suggestive of some of these elements, is within the normal range. 
Other testing reveals a tendency towards emotionality which was 
also observed by this examiner when Jim tearfully talked about 
the difficulties that Jessica has had with the divorce. He is 
currently frustrated that the efforts that he made to preserve 
his marriage were not good enough. He appears accepting of 
faults in himself and others and yet still would like to achieve 
his potential. He is very attached to his home, prefers a more 
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rural lifestyle, and has a very traditional sense of what family 
life entails. 
PARENTING STYLE: 
Jim appears very concerned about the confusion and difficulty 
that Jessica is having with the divorce. He is very protective 
of her and indicated that he would reject the notion of joint 
physical custody because it woo-Zd--be too_ difficult for Jessica. 
He does not object to joint Ipgal custody, cut would want to be 
the primary custodial -- He recognizes that Lynne loves Jessica 
very, much just as he does__bu.t_he _feels_ that be_ could_ give_Jessica 
more personal attention, wo»"M not- let anv h*H moods affect' hpr. 
a~nd is more family oriented that is Lynne and Jber _f amily. He 
teels that Lynne relies on" "heir motner" coo much and doesn't" spend 
enough personal time with Jessica. He^.-rears^ that Lynne would 
push Jessica away and yel] at her when she* Is *iri~_j3_bad mood", as 
siie reportedly did duri'ng tfhe marriage, and~that the emotional 
demands that Lynne would place on Jessica would affect her 
negatively. He is also concerned about Lynne not attending to 
Jessica's safety needs. Besides the bathtub incident, he noted 
that Lynne once let Jessica under a car when he was working on 
it. 
Jim fears that Lynne would be very controlling (like her father) 
in her r e l a t i o n s h i p with Jessica as she was with him. 
Reportedly, Lynne would stress activities such as dance lessons 
whereas Jim feels that Jessica should be more involved in the 
home, with her friends, and with her family. He would, thus, 
give priority to personal time. 
Jim currently works a six-day week alternated with a four-day 
week; his hours are 8:00 to 5:00. In the summer, one out of 
five weeks, he works a shift of 10:00 to 7:00. If he had 
custody, he would place Jessica in the same day care she attended 
before. ' Both Jim and Lynne agree that she received very good 
care there. It is suspected that he would be generous in 
granting visitation time to both Lynne and her mother, following 
a schedule similar to the one he has now. 
All those interviewed indicated that Jessica does not pose 
disciplinary problems. Jim admitted that he is not much_qf __a_ 
disciplinarian. Likewise, Tfm is not particularly aetinirive or 
detailed in his responses to written questions about how he 
would handle situations with children. While there is no 
suggestion that he would be inappropriate in his handling of 
situations, he could probably use a greater repertoire of 
techniques and more confidence in this area. 
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Mrs. Steadman, Jessica's day care teacher, noted that she hnew 
Jim bett&z "th-aLi Lynne because he often transported Jessica to and 
from day care. She observed that Jessica tended to ask for her 
father rather than her mother when she was stressed or upset 
about something during the day; Mrs. Steadman thus believes that 
they had a very strong attachment. Neighbors also wrote letters 
supporting the notion that Jim and Jessica were well bonded and-
spent a great deal of time together while Lynne visited her 
friend in the neighborhood. 
During the home visit, Jessica was engaged in watching cartoons 
and was rather weary of a stranger coming into her home wanting 
to see her room, etc. She seemed very attached to her father and 
there was a great deal of physical affection displayed between 
the two of them. Jessica was less physically active and 
spontaneous during this visit but it was probably because this 
was our first meeting. She became very distressed and tried to 
comfort her father when he became tearful in response to some 
questions about her adaptation to the visitation. Apparently, 
Jessica is also very sensitive to her mother's emotions. Jim 
indicated that Jessica often asks him to come over when he calls 
her and tells him that she misses him. Jim recognizes that she 
is now becoming more used to living with her mother. He appears 
to care a great deal about her comfort level. Lynne noted that 
once when Jessica had trouble going on a visitation with him, he 
brought her back until she was more comfortable and ready to go. 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS; 
Jim is a very emotionally sensitive individual who seems to be 
genuinely concerned about his daughter's welfare and, therefore, 
is seeking custody. He has an easygoing nature, which sometimes 
prevents him from accomplishing all that he wishes. He also has 
some shortcomings as a disciplinarian. Nevertheless, he appears 
to be the very reliable and caring individual that others have 
perceived him to be. He places a high value on family life and 
undoubtedly will marry again and have more children. 
Please see Custody Recommendations. 
Monica D. Christy, Ph ,/D. 
MDC:slb 
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MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, ?.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
CHERIE LYNN TUCKER, 
Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
-vs- Civil No. 914903959DA 
JAMES CALVIN TUCKER, Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before the 
above-entitled court on Monday, the 22nd and 23rd day of February, 
1993, the Honoraole Franx G. Noel, District Court Judge presiding; 
the court having proceeded tc hear the testimony of the parties and 
their witnesses, to receive the exnibits of the parties, to hear 
the arguments of parties' counsel, and to review the file and the 
pleadings contained therein, and to review the custody evaluation 
and report filed by Dr. Monica Christy with the court, and the 
evaluation ana report filea cy jr. uonaiu S^rassDery, cu.u ~-iw 
thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court now makes and 
•1AY t 1 TS23 
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enters the following: 
FIFPINGg OF FftC?T 
1. Eacn party r.as been a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah for three monrns or more immediately prior to the filing of 
this action. 
2. That the parties are nusoand and wife having been married 
February 26, 1988 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. There are irreconcilable differences between the parties 
and eacn party is entitled to receive a Decree of Divorce from the 
other upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
4. The parties maintained their marital domicile in Salt 
Lake County, Stare of Utan, and the acts complained of herein 
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. There has been one minor child born as issue of the 
parties' marriage, namely, Jessica, born November 30, 1988. 
6. Neither party is receiving any public assistance for the 
benefit of the minor child. 
7. No proceedings involving the custody of the child have 
been filed or are pending in the juvenile court or in any other 
state. 
8. The plaintiff is employed by TCI Cable in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The defendant is also employed by TCI Cable in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The court finds that the plaintiff's gross income is 
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in the sum of $1,582.00 per month. The court finds that the 
defendant's gross income is in the sum of $2f021.00 per month. 
9. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired an interest in certain real property located in Salt Lake 
County, State of 7tan, commonly know as 3406 West 13175 South, 
Riverton, Utah 84065. This property is currently the subject of a 
mortgage indeoteaness, and the mortgage payment for the property is 
in the approximate sum of $600.00 per month. 
10. The parties separated on or about July 1, 1991. At the 
time of the separation, the plaintiff moved out of the marital 
residence of the parties, taking the minor child, Jessica, with 
her. The defendant has remained in the marital residence 
continuously since the parties' separation, and has paid the 
mortgage obligation tnereon since July i, 1991, without 
contribution from the plaintiff. 
11. It is reasonable, just and proper that the marital 
residence be appraised forthwith, by a duly qualified real estate 
appraiser, and that the cost of the appraisal be shared equally by 
the parties. Further, it is reasonable that the net equity of the 
parties in the property, as determined by appraisal, be divided 
between the parties. Specifically, this should be accomplished as 
follows: 
a. The defendant snould be awarded all right, title and 
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interest in the real property free and clear of any interest of the 
plaintiff, subject to the mortgage indebtedness thereon which 
defendant should be ordered to pay and assume and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless thereon. 
b. Plaintiff should be awarded a lien upon the real 
property for one-half the parties' net equity in the property, said 
lien to be interest bearing at the rate of 6% per annum, from the 
date hereof, and said lien to be payable by defendant to plaintiff 
upon the first to occur of the following events: 
i. The sale of the property at the defendant's 
election; 
ii. The defendant's remarriage or cohabitation in 
the home with an unrelated adult; 
iii. The defencant ceasing to use the home as his 
primary place of residence; 
iv. The death of the defendant; 
v. Five years from the date of signing and entry 
of the Decree of Divorce herein. 
12. During the course cf their marriage, the parties have 
acquired an interest in a tineshare in East Canyon Resort. It is 
reasonable, just and proper that this time share be sold as soon as 
is commercially feasible at a commercially reasonable sales price, 
and that the parties be ordered to cooperate in that sale and to 
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use their best efforts to accomplish that sale. Out of the 
proceeds of the sale, the defendant's mother should be reimbursed 
for ail sums expended by her during the separation of the parties 
to preserve this asset. After payment of the underlying mortgage 
obligation, outstanding fees and assessments of the condominium 
group, and the payment of the defendant's mother, the remaining 
sale proceeds, if any, or loss, if any, should be divided equally 
between the parties, one-half to each. 
13. During the course of their marriage, the parties have 
each acquired a retirement plan through their respective 
employment, and each party should be awarded all right, title, and 
inrerest in his cr her own retirement plan, free and clear of any 
interest of the other party. 
14. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired an interest in certain motor vehicles, including a 1987 
Hyundai, 1970 pickup truck, a camper, and a 1984 Topaz. The 1987 
Hyundai and the camper should be awarded to the plaintiff free and 
clear of any interest of the defendant, subject to any indebtedness 
incurred thereon, which the plaintiff should be ordered to pay and 
assume and to hold defendant harmless thereon. The 1970 pickup 
truck and the 1984 Topaz should be awarded to the defendant free 
and clear of any interest cf the plaintiff, subject to any 
indebtedness incurred thereon, wnich defendant should be ordered to 
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pay and assume and to hold plaintiff harmless thereon. Plaintiff 
made claim at trial that the 1987 Hyundai was a premarital asset of 
the plaintiff and should be awarded to her as her sole and separate 
property. However, the court finds thatf though the car was 
purchased by plaintiff prior to the parties7 marriage, it was paid 
for in substantial part jointly by the parties during their 
marriage out of their joint incomes, and the court finds that the 
Hyundai is a marital asset. 
15. During the course of their marriage the parties received 
income tax returns for the tax year 1991, in the sum of $250.17 
from the State of Utah, and $1,061.41 from the United States of 
America. These checks are currently in the trust account of 
defendant's counsel. These sums should be divided equally between 
the parties, one-half to each. Further, plaintiff should receive 
interest on these income tax refunds at the rate of 6% per annum 
for a period of 11 months. 
16. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired an interest in certain items of household furnishings and 
fixtures and personal clothing and effects. Each party should be 
awarded the personalty currently in his or her possession with the 
exception that the defendant should be awarded all personal 
clothing and effects and furniture associated with the minor child 
of the parties, for reason that he will have custody of the minor 
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child. Specifically, defendant should be awarded the crib which 
was the crib for the parties' child. 
17. Each party to this acrion is able bodied and employable. 
The marriage of the parries is of relatively short duration. The 
plaintiff is currently 33 years of age. The defendant was 34 years 
of age ar the time of trial and turned 35 on March 26, 1993. 
Furrher, the courr finds -hat the plainriff is currently living 
under circumsrances which constitute cohabitation within the 
meaning of Utah law. Furrher, both parties to this action have 
waived their respective claims to alimony, during the course of the 
trial. Based thereon ir is reasonable, just and proper that 
neither party be awarded any alimony from the other. 
18. A custody evaiuarion was conducted herein by Dr. Monica 
Christy. Defendant advanced the cost of that evaluation. It is 
reasonable, just and proper that the defendant continue to bear the 
costs of that evaluation, in full, and that the plaintiff not be 
required to contribute to the cost of that evaluation. Dr. Donald 
Strassberg conducted an evaluation of plaintiff and the parties' 
child. Plaintiff advanced the costs of that evaluation. It is 
reasonable, just and proper that the plaintiff continue to bear the 
costs of that evaluation, in full, and that the defendant not be 
required to contribute to the costs of that evaluation. 
19. It is reasonable, just and proper that each party pay and 
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assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
this action. 
20. During the course of their marriage, the parties have 
incurred certain debts and obligations, which should be paid and 
assumed according to the schedule of proposed distribution of 
indebtedness set forts m the plaintiff's Exhibit 11, admitted at 
the time of trial, with the exception of the debt to East Canyon 
resort, which is referred to in paragrapn 12 above. 
21. Each party has health and accident insurance coverage 
available to him or to her through employment. Each party works 
for the same company, and therefore has identical health insurance 
benefits available for the minor child. The court finds that it is 
reasonable, just and proper that the defendant be ordered to 
maintain the same health insurance coverage which has previously 
been maintained by the plaintiff in behalf of the minor child, or 
its equivalent, so long as sucn health insurance is available to 
the defendant through his employment at reasonable cost. Plaintiff 
should not be ordered to maintain health and accident insurance 
coverage for the minor child. The court finds it is appropriate 
that the defendant maintain health insurance coverage rather than 
the plaintiff, because the defendant will be the custodial parent 
for the minor child, and it will facilitate the health insurance 
claims process if the custodial parent is also the insured party. 
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22. The court finds that the issue of greatest concern to 
both parries to this action is the issue of child custody. It is 
reasonable, just and proper, and is in the best interest of the 
minor child, that the defendant be awarded the permanent physical 
care, custody, and control of the child, subject to plaintiff's 
reasonable and liberal rignts of visitation as defined below. In 
support of this finding regarding custody, the court makes the 
following specific findings: 
a. A child custody evaluation was conducted herein by 
Dr. Monica Christy, who was the only independent evaluator who 
assessed both parties to testify at the time of trial, regarding 
the issue of custody. Dr. Monica Christy recommended that the 
defendant have custody of the parties7 minor child. An evaluation 
was conducted herein by Dr. Donald Strassberg, who assessed the 
plaintiff and the parties' child, but did not assess the defendant. 
Dr. Strassberg found that plaintiff was a fit and appropriate 
parent and that custody should be awarded to plaintiff. The court 
finds that it should rely en the recommendation of Dr. Monica 
Christy and should not accept the recommendation of Dr. Donald 
Strassberg; 
b. The minor child is now four years of age and is not 
yet attending school. The plaintiff has had the temporary care, 
custody and control of the miner child during the pendency of these 
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divorce proceedings, at first by reason of the parties' conduct, 
and then pursuant to temporary order of this court, and this 
condition has existed since approximately July l, 1991; 
c. The court finds that a change in custody of the 
minor child from the plaintiff to the defendant will not be 
substantially traumatic to the minor child because of her age, 
genera, condition of health and wellbeing as testified to by Dr. 
Monica Christy, and Dr. Donald Strassberg, the level of bonding to 
her father, and the circumstances of the parties. The court finds 
that in the long run, any trauma caused by a change in the custody 
arrangement will be temporary and will be off-set by a long term 
advantage to the minor child of living with her father; 
d. The court finds that the minor child has a stronger 
bonding to her father, based upon the testimony of the minor 
child's day care provider. The court finds that the minor child is 
also closeiy bonded to her mother; 
e. The court finds that there is a history of emotional 
instability on the part of the plaintiff. The court finds that 
there has been substantial progress made by the plaintiff during 
the separation of the parties, in personal therapy and treatment, 
and the court commends her for this progress, but the court finds 
that the father is still significantly more stable; 
f. The court finds that the issue of the minor child's 
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preference is moor, fcr reason that the minor child has expressed 
no preference, and the child is of such tender years that any 
preference expressed would be irrelevant; 
g. The minor child has no siblings, half-blood 
siblings, nor step-siblings. Therefore, a consideration of the 
status of her siblings is nor relevant in this action; 
h. The courr finds rhat the defendant is able to spend 
a bit more time providing personal care for the minor child then is 
rhe plaintiff; 
i. The courr finds that the child7s church functions 
and acrivities are imporranr personally to the child. The court 
finds thar there is more religious comparibility between the 
defendanr and the minor child, and thar the defendant is more 
likely to fcsrer a continued involvement of the minor child in the 
church acriviries in which she has previously participated than is 
the plaintiff; 
j. The courr finds that, because of moral issues 
presenred in this case, the defendant is a more fit parent to 
exercise cusrody of the minor child than is the plaintiff. 
Specifically, the courr analyzes the circumstances of the plaintiff 
as follows: 
i. The plaintiff and other witnesses have 
tesrified to the status of the plaintiff as a lesbian or bisexual 
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individual who is currently involved in a monogamous intimate 
relationship, that amounts to cohabitation, with another woman. 
Specifically, plaintiff and her female companion have purchased a 
home together and cohabited together for a period of approximately 
five months prior to trial, first in the home of plaintiff's 
parents, then in their own home, prior to the trial; 
ii. The court finds that the status of the 
plaintiff as a lesbian or bi-sexual does not bear directly on her 
parenting abilities, and the court finds that she should not be 
deprived of custody of her ninor child based upon her sexual 
preference• Both Dr. Monica Christy and Dr. Donald Strassburg 
testified that homosexuality is not a mental illness nor a 
deviancy, and the court adopts this finding; 
iii. The plaintiff has chosen to act out her sexual 
preference by conducting a relationship with a woman companion 
involving cohabitation without benefit of marriage in the same home 
with the minor child. The court finds that this can be analyzed 
and should be analyzed similarly to a situation involving 
cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex without benefit of 
marriage in the presence of a ninor child. The court finds that 
this conduct on the part of the plaintiff during the pendency of 
this action and prior to the custody trial in -this matter 
demonstrates a lack of i^orai example to the child and a lack of 
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moral fitness. This conduct is unlawful in the State of Utah; and, 
k. The plaintiff 's companion was not a witness at trial 
nor evaluated by any expert witness as to her fitness to act in the 
role of step-parent to the child. 
23. The court finds that the parties are capable of making a 
joint legal custody arrangement work, and that such a joint legal 
custody arrangement would be in the best interest of the minor 
child. Therefore, the plaintiff and defendant should be awarded 
joint legal custody of the child with the defendant to be the sole 
physical custodian of the child, and with plaintiff to have 
reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. 
24. Plaintiff should be permitted unrestricted access to the 
medical and educational records of the minor child and the 
defendant should consult the plaintiff before making any major 
decisions regarding the health, education or welfare of the minor 
child. However, in the event of a conflict between the parties 
regarding such decisions, the determination of the defendant should 
be governing. 
25. Plaintiff should be awarded reasonable and liberal rights 
of visitation with the minor child, to be defined, in the event 
that the parties are unable to agree upon a schedule of visitation, 
as follows: 
a. each Wednesday evening from 5:30 p.m. until 
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3:20 p.m.; and 
b. alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
c. Holiday visitation shall be defined as 6:00 
p.m. the day of the holiday until 7:00 p.m. the day after 
the holiday unless specified otherwise. The parties 
shall alternate with plaintiff to have the following 
holidays in odd numbered years: Human Rights Day; Easter 
from Friday 6:00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m.; Memorial Day 
from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday at 7:00 p.m.; July 
24th to 11:00 p.m.; Veteran's Day; the day before the 
child's birthday from 2:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; the 
first half of Christmas vacation, including Christmas Eve 
and Christmas Day to 1:00 p.m.; and in the even numbered 
years: New Year's Day; President's Day; July 4th to 
11:00 p.m.; Labor Day from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday 
at 7:00 p.m.; Columbus Day; UEA weekend from Wednesday at 
6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; the child's actual 
birthday from 2:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; Thanksgiving 
from Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
the second half of Christmas vacation and from 1:00 p.m. 
to 9:00 p.m. on Christmas Day; and 
d. Father's Day with the Father from 9:00 a.m. to 
7:00 p.m.; 
e. Mother's Day with the Mother from 9:00 a.m. 
until 7:00 p.m.; 
f. Summer to consist of four weeks, or, if the 
child is in year round school, one-half of the school 
breaks, with the custodial parent to be allowed two weeks 
uninterrupted vacation. Notification of summer 
visitation or vacation weeks with the child should be 
provided in writing to the other parent at least 30 days 
in advance; and 
g. Telephone contact at reasonable hours. 
26. The transition of custody from the plaintiff to the 
defendant should occur over a period during March and April of 
1993. Defendant's visitation with the minor child should increase 
gradually over this period of time, and the plaintiff's physical 
custody of the minor child should decrease gradually such that the 
defendant has full-tine custody on or about May 1, 1993. 
27. Defendant should be ordered to continue to pay child 
support to the plaintiff for the months of March and April, 1993. 
In the month of May, 1993, defendant's child support obligation to 
the plaintiff should terminate, and plaintiff should be ordered to 
pay child support to the defendant, in conformity with the Utah 
Uniform Child Support Guidelir.es and the child support obligation 
worksheet which is attached hereto and incorporated herein 
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reference. Plaintiff's child support obligation to the defendant, 
commencing May 1, 1993, will be in the sum of $169.00f together 
with one-half of the defendants work-related day care expenses 
reasonably and actually incurred for the minor child. Further, 
this support should continue until the minor child achieves the age 
of 18 years or graduates from high school in the normal course of 
her high school education, whichever event occurs later. 
28. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein. 
29. If the plaintiff falls thirty (30) or more days in 
arrears in her child support obligation, the defendant should be 
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 62A-I1-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988). 
FROM THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF TAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this 
action and over the subjeer matter of this action. 
21 The parties are entitled to a Decree of Divorce from one 
another, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing 
between the parties, the same to become final and effective 
immediately upon being signed by the Judge and entered by the 
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Clerk. 
3. The Decree of Divorce granted to plaintiff should be in 
conformance with the. foregoing Findings of Fact. 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED: ~ w r^ ~*3 
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• ""Vi? district 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
CHERIE LYNN TUCKER, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JAMES CALVIN TUCKER, 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before the 
above-entitled court on Monday, the 22nd and 23rd day of February, 
1993, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge presiding; 
the court having proceeded to hear the testimony of the parties and 
their witnesses, to receive the exhibits of the parties, to hear 
the arguments of parties' counsel, and to review the file and the 
pleadings contained therein, and to review the custody evaluation 
and report filed by Dr. Monica Christy with the court, and the 
evaluation and report filed by Dr. Donald Strassberg, and having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now, therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
•MAY I 1 190 
xr -c,i».»Lr'"Y 
1400 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 914903959DA 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon 
being signed by the Judge and entered by the clerk. 
2. It is hereby ordered that the marital residence be 
appraised forthwith, by duly a qualified real estate appraiser, and 
that the cost of the appraisal be shared equally by the parties. 
Further, it is ordered that the net equity of the parties in the 
property, as determined by appraisal, be divided between the 
parties. Specifically, this should be accomplished as follows: 
a. The defendant is awarded all right, title and 
interest in the real property free and clear of any interest of the 
plaintiff, subject to the mortgage indebtedness thereon which 
defendanr is ordered to pay and assume and to hold the plaintiff 
harmless thereon. 
b. Plaintiff is awarded a lien upon the real property 
for one-half the parties7 net equity in the property, said lien to 
be interest bearing at the rare of 6% per annum, from the date 
hereof, and said lien to be payable by defendant to plaintiff upon 
the firsr to occur of the following events: 
i. The sale of the property at the defendant's 
election; 
ii. The defendant's remarriage or cohabitation in 
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the home with an unrelated adult; 
iii. The defendant ceasing to use the home as his 
primary place of residence; 
iv. The death of the defendant; 
v. Five years from the date of signing and entry 
of the Decree of Divorce herein. 
3. It is hereby ordered that the timeshare in East Canyon 
Resorx be sold as soon as is commercially feasible at a 
commercially reasonable sales price, and the parties are ordered to 
cooperate in that sale and to use their best efforts to accomplish 
that sale. Out of the proceeds of the sale, the defendant's mother 
should be reimbursed for ail sums expended by her during the 
separarion of the parties ro preserve this asset. After payment of 
the underlying raorrgage obligation, outstanding fees and 
assessmenrs of the condominium group, and the payment of the 
defendants mother, the remaining sale proceeds, if any, or loss, 
if any, shall be divided equally between the parties, one-half to 
each. 
4. Each party is awarded all right, title, and interest in 
his or her own retirement plan, free and clear of any interest of 
the other party. 
5. The 1987 Hyundai and the camper are awarded to the 
plaintiff free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject 
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to any indebtedness incurred thereon, which the plaintiff is 
ordered to pay and assume and to hold defendant harmless thereon* 
The 1970 pickup truck and the 1984 Topaz are awarded to the 
defendant free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff, subject 
to any indebtedness incurred thereon, which defendant is ordered to 
pay and assume and to hold plaintiff harmless thereon. 
6. The income tax refund checks are to be divided equally 
between the parries, one-half to each. Further, plaintiff is to 
receive interest on these income tax refunds at the rate of 6% per 
annum for a period of 11 months. 
7. Each party is awarded the personalty currently in his or 
her possession with the exception that the defendant is awarded all 
personal clothing and effects and furniture associated with the 
minor child of the parties. Specifically, defendant is awarded the 
crib which was the crib for the parties7 child. 
8. Neither party is awarded any alimony from the other. 
9. The defendant is ordered to bear the costs of the custody 
evaluation of Dr. Moncia Christy, in full, and plaintiff is not 
required to contribute to the cost of that evaluation, or to the 
testimony of the evaluator at trial. The plaintiff is ordered to 
bear the costs of the evaluation of Dr. Donald Strassberg, in full, 
and defendant is not required to contribute to the cost of that 
evaluation, or to the testimony of the evaluator at trial. 
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10. Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own 
court costs and attorney's fees incurred in this action. 
11. The parties7 debts and obligations are to be paid and 
assumed according to the schedule of proposed distribution of 
indebtedness as follows: 
TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFF: ZCMI, ZCMI Credit Union loan 
and overdraft, Mervyn's, Discover, First Security Bank VISA, 
EDUSERV student loan, Jodi Leslie and Ron Birch. 
TO BE PAID BY DEFENDANT: Rocky Mountain VISA, the water 
softener debt, and all credit cards and loans incurred in his own 
name. 
12. The defendant is ordered to maintain the same health 
insurance coverage which has previously been maintained by the 
plaintiff in behalf of the minor child, or its equivalent, so long 
as such health insurance if available to defendant through his 
employment at reasonable cost. Plaintiff is not ordered to 
maintain health and accident insurance coverage for the minor 
child. 
13. The plaintiff and defendant are awarded joint legal 
custody of the child, and defendant is awarded the sole physical 
custody of the child, with plaintiff to have reasonable and liberal 
rights of visitation. 
14. Plaintiff is permitted unrestricted access to the medical 
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and educational records of the minor child and the defendant is 
ordered to consult the plaintiff before making any major decisions 
regarding the health, education or welfare of the minor child. 
However, in the event of a conflict between the parties regarding 
such decisions, the determination of the defendant is governing. 
15. Plaintiff's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation 
with the minor child, shall be defined, in the event that the 
parties are unable to agree upon a schedule of visitation, as 
follows: 
a. each Wednesday evening from 5:30 p.m. until 
8:30 p.m.; and 
b. alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
c. Holiday visitation shall be defined as 6:00 
p.m. the day of the holiday until 7:00 p.m. the day after 
the holiday unless specified otherwise. The parties 
shall alternate with plaintiff to have the following 
holidays in odd numbered years: Human Rights Day; Easter 
from Friday 6:00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m.; Memorial Day 
from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday at 7:00 p.m.; July 
24th to 11:00 p.m.; Veteran's Day; the day before the 
child's birthday from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; the 
first half of Christmas vacation, including Christmas Eve 
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and Christmas Day to 1:00 p.m.; and in the even numbered 
years: New Year's Day; President's Day; July 4th to 
11:00 p.m.; Labor Day from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday 
at 7:00 p.m.; Columbus Day; UEA weekend from Wednesday at 
6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; the child's actual 
birthday from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; Thanksgiving 
from Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
the second half of Christmas vacation and from 1:00 p.m. 
to 9:00 p.m. on Christmas Day; and 
d. Father's Day with the Father from 9:00 a.m. to 
7:00 p.m.; 
e. Mother's Day with the Mother from 9:00 a.m. 
until 7:00 p.m.; 
f. Summer to consist of four weeks, or, if the 
child is in year round school, one-half of the school 
breaks, with the custodial parent to be allowed two weeks 
uninterrupted vacation. Notification of summer 
visitation or vacation weeks with the child shall be 
provided in writing to the other parent at least 30 days 
in advance; and 
g. Telephone contact at reasonable hours. 
16. The transition of custody from the plaintiff to the 
defendant is to occur over a period during March and April of 1993. 
Defendant's visitation with the minor child shall increase 
gradually over this period of time, and the plaintiff's physical 
custody of the ininor child shall decrease gradually such that the 
defendant has full-time custody on or about May 1, 1993 • 
17. Defendant is ordered to continue to pay child support to 
the plaintiff for the months of March and April, 1993, In the 
month of May, 1993, defendant's child support obligation to the 
plaintiff terminates, and plaintiff is ordered to pay child support 
to the defendant, commencing May 1, 1993, in the sum of $169• 00 per 
month, together with one-half of the defendant's work related day 
care expenses reasonably and actually incurred for the minor child, 
until the child attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high 
school in due course, whichever last occurs. 
18. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein. 
19. If the plaintiff falls in arrears in her child support 
obligation, the defendant is entitled to mandatory income 
withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 62A-
11-401, £t. sea. (Supp. 1988). 
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DATED THIS 
Approved: 
FRANK G. NOEL 
D i s t r i c r Courx Judge 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
DATED: •><"- & - 93 
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